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Abstract 
In a choice model of risky assets the role of risk aversion is analyzed. The measure of 
risk preference comes from a direct subjective survey question and it is considered as an 
imperfect information about the true risk attitude of investors. Misclassification between the 
true and the observed risk aversion is explicitly taken into account in the empirical model. A 
Data Augmentation approach, a Bayesian procedure for incomplete-data problems, is applied 
on data from the 2006 Survey of Household Income and Wealth by the Bank of Italy. 
Results indicate that when misclassification of investors is taken into account model 
estimates show the good performance of the subjective question when used as a control in a 
portfolio choice models. Moreover risk aversion emerges as a strong predictor of the 
probability to hold risky assets. The analysis also shows that probability of misclassification 
decreases as latent risk aversion increases, that means that more risk tolerant investors tend 
to be classified erroneously more often than less risk tolerant investors. 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations. 1 Introduction1
This paper applies discrete econometric Bayesian techniques to microeconomic data on household port-
folio composition taken from the Bank of Italy￿ s 2006 Survey of Household Income and Wealth, in order
to shed light on the role of risk aversion in the individual choice to hold risky assets.
Empirical analyses of the portfolio choices of households or individuals indicate that observed choices
are often inconsistent with standard asset allocation models. As a consequence, several studies have
focused on empirical failures of portfolio theory. The greatest failure is perhaps the fact that the majority
of individuals do not hold fully diversi￿ed portfolios, although the percentage of households holding risky
assets has increased over the last decade (Haliassos and Hassapis, 1998).
Although the rational model of choice is unable to explain several empirical phenomena, it is often
hard to determine in more detail what the underlying cause of disparities between theory and empirical
facts may be. For this reason some authors have turned to more direct, subjective evidence on preferences
to reduce the distance between theory and empirical facts. A prominent example is the role of risk
preference.
In order to provide evidence on the role of risk aversion one needs to be able to measure it at
the individual level, but individual risk aversion is not normally observable. One way to estimate the
degree of risk preference is to utilize survey questions concerning hypothetical choices between uncertain
income streams. Guiso and Paiella (2001) use a sample of 8,135 heads of households from the Survey
on Household Income and Wealth and measure risk preferences with an abstractly-framed, hypothetical
lottery. Diaz-Serrano and O￿ Neill (2004) use the same sample but also add the next wave of the survey.
Donkers et al. (2001) use a sample of 4,000 individuals living in the Netherlands and measure risk
preferences with a series of abstract lotteries. Barsky et al. (1997) use an especially large sample,
14,000 individuals living in the US drawn from the Health and Retirement Survey, and measure risk
preferences using a hypothetical lottery involving di⁄erent income streams.
However, all these measures have theoretical and empirical problems. First of all, the wording of the
question is usually quite complicated and many respondents may have a hard time understanding the
exact meaning, thus producing considerable missing values or scarce reliability. Secondly, the answer is
conditioned by the respondent￿ s current situation. For instance, a risk tolerant individual with a risky
portfolio may be induced to choose a safe income stream since he is already exposed to considerable
risk. Conversely, a risk averse individual with a safe portfolio can a⁄ord to choose a riskier income
path. In both cases the observed relationship between the measured risk tolerance and portfolio choice
is attenuated (Kapteyn and Teppa, 2002).
Dohmen et al. (2005) use a new set of survey measures, collected for a representative sample of
22,000 individuals: one question is about the attitude towards risk in general, ￿ve questions refer to
risk attitude in speci￿c contexts (car driving, ￿nancial matters, leisure and sport, career, and health),
and the last question corresponds to the lottery measures used in previous studies. They ￿nd that the
general risk question is the best all-round predictor of risky behavior, outperforming a lottery measure
1The author wishes to thank Giovanni D￿ Alessio, Leandro D￿ Aurizio, Ivan Faiella, Massimo Sbracia, Alessandro Secchi
and Luigi Federico Signorini for their very useful comments.
3or domain-speci￿c measures.
All the measures of risk aversion are unavoidably a› icted with errors that, in some cases, may
lead to serious misclassi￿cation of investors. In general, estimated associations between an outcome
variable and a mismeasured covariate tend to be biased when the methods of estimation that ignore
the classi￿cation error are applied. The identi￿cation and estimation of models that are non linear in
mismeasured variables is a notoriously di¢ cult problem (Carroll, Ruppert and Stefanaski, 1995). There
are three possible approaches to this: (1) the parametric approach; (2) methods that use additional
sample information, such as a validation sample or replicate measurements; (3) the instrumental variable
method.
The parametric approach makes strong and untestable distributional assumptions. In particular, it
is assumed that the distribution of the measurement error is in some parametric class (Hsiao, 1989).
The second approach is to use additional sample information in the form of replicate measurements
or in the form of a validation sample. The sample contains replicate measurements if there are at least
two mismeasured variables that correspond to the same latent true value. Li and Vuong (1998) show
that if the measurements errors in the two measurements are stochastically independent, the distribution
of the latent true value is non-parametrically identi￿ed.
The third approach is the instrumental variable method. In an errors-in-variables model, a valid
instrument is a variable that (a) can be excluded from the model, (b) is correlated with the latent
variable, and (c) is independent of the measurement error. The IV method was developed for linear
models, and, in general, IV estimators are biased in nonlinear models (Amemiya, 1985). However Carroll
and Stefanaski (1990) obtain a consistent IV estimator in nonlinear models under the assumption that
the measurement error vanishes if the sample size increases. Newey (2001) considers the nonlinear
regression model, but he notes that there are no general results on the non-parametric identi￿cation of
nonlinear models with mismeasured regressors by instrumental variables.
When the mismeasured covariate is categorical, measurement error in nonlinear models introduces
di¢ culties whose solutions require techniques that are quite di⁄erent from those usually called for in
linear models. The independence assumption between the measurement error and the latent variable,
invoked by the classical model for measurement error, is particularly untenable. More generally, the
phenomenon of negative correlation between the errors and the true values (referred to as "mean rever-
sion") has been found to exist for a number of quantities of interest, for example in earnings data by
Bound and Krueger (1991) and Bollinger (1998).
This paper exploits a subjective measure of risk preference in a choice model of risky assets. The
available measure of risk preference is assumed to be an imperfect information so that in the empirical
model the true risk attitude variable is considered as a latent class variable. A Bayesian approach
through a Monte Carlo Markov chain procedure is developed in order to estimate the empirical model
of ownership of risky assets where the latent risk attitude variable is one of the determinants. The
key idea of the approach is to introduce the values of the latent variable explicitly into the estimation
process as missing data. The problem thus involves two types of unknown quantities, the parameters
to be estimated and the missing data, unobserved because of measurement error. This distinction
4seems well suited to misclassi￿cation problems where it simpli￿es the analysis both conceptually and
computationally with respect to other methods of estimation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the choice model of risky assets and the
distributional assumptions needed for its identi￿cation. Section 3 illustrates the Bayesian procedure for
model estimation. Section 4 describes the data-set, the model estimated and interprets the results. In
section 5 the main conclusions are drawn.
2 The model speci￿cation
In this section I ￿rst present a standard model of risky assets ownership where the role of risk aversion
is emphasized (section 2.1). Next, under the hypothesis that the risk aversion variable is a⁄ected by
misclassi￿cation, I introduce three basic assumptions in order to achieve model identi￿cation (section
2.2). In particular, one of the assumptions implies that the misclassi￿cation probability is independent
from any other explanatory variables. This is a strong but necessary assumption when only one surrogate
for the latent variable is available. Finally, the model is developed by relaxing the assumption of
independent misclassi￿cation under the hypothesis that two surrogates for the latent risk aversion are
available (section 2.3).
2.1 The demand model for risky assets
My interest is in household ownership of risky assets. I do not observe the value of the desired level
of risky assets y￿
i for each household i but I know whether households hold risky assets and I want to









Now let￿ s assume that the desired level of risky assets is a linear function of a set of exogenous variables
zi:
y￿
i = ￿0zi + "i (1)






1 if "i > ￿￿0zi
0 if "i ￿ ￿￿0zi
I assume F() is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable "i. This implies
E (yijzi) = Pr(yi = 1jzi) = F (￿0zi) (2)
Among the exogenous variables zi, an important role is played by the risk preference variable. For the
sake of simplicity I consider only two groups of investors characterized by two degrees of risk attitude:
5Ii = 0 when household i has a low aversion to risk; Ii = 1 when household i has a high aversion to risk.
Generalization to more than two groups of investors is straightforward.
Model (2) can then be expressed as:






where xi denotes sociodemographic and economic characteristics of household i and ￿ measures the
marginal e⁄ect of the degree of risk aversion on the desired level of risky assets.
Suppose I know exactly whether household i comes from the low risk aversion group or the high risk
aversion group. In this case I have a perfect sample separation information and equation (3) can be
estimated straightforwardly.
2.2 The assumption of independent misclassi￿cation
I now consider the situation where information about individual risk aversion is available but imperfect.
In particular, suppose I know a dichotomous variable wi for each household i resulting from the known
sample separation information. In this case, Ii is the latent true discrete variable which is subject to
misclassi￿cation error, and wi is known as a "surrogate" for Ii. Following the current literature, the
indicator wi can be obtained from survey subjective questions regarding household risk preferences.
I ￿rst consider the problem in a non-parametric setting with no functional form assumption for the
binary choice model. I do, however, place two restrictions on the nature of the measurement error. The
￿rst assumes that the outcome y is independent of wi conditional on the correctly measured random
variable Ii and the other explanatory variables xi. Formally:
Pr(yi = 1jIi;wi;xi) = Pr(yi = 1jIi;xi) (Assumpt. 1)
In the literature this is usually referred to as the assumption of non-di⁄erential measurement error, and
implies that the measurement error is uninformative about the response given information on the truth.
The conditional statement is important since the misclassi￿cation rates may in fact be informative about
responses through their correlation with other variables in the model.
The second restriction limits the extent of the measurement error by requiring that the probability
of a correct classi￿cation be greater than that of an incorrect one, i.e.,
Pr(wi = 1jIi = 1;xi) > Pr(wi = 1jIi = 0;xi) (Assumpt. 2)
This ensures that the unobserved variable Ii is positively connected with its surrogate wi. This basically
means that the direction of the e⁄ect of the surrogate on the response yi is the same as the e⁄ect of the
latent variable.
Manski and Tamer (2002) show that if xi are binary variables there is no ￿nite bound for ￿ at
all, whereas if the support of xi is unbounded ￿ is point identi￿ed. In contrast, the sign of ￿ is always
identi￿ed regardless of the assumption on the support of xi. This implies that model (3) under Assumpt.
2 is only partially identi￿ed. We need to add one more assumption to achieve identi￿cation.
6The assumption is that the probability of misclassi￿cation is independent of the other explanatory
variables in the model. Formally:
Pr(wi = 1jIi;xi) = Pr(wi = 1jIi) (Assumpt. 3)
Given that the relationship between the latent variable and its surrogate is de￿ned by the following
transition probability matrix:
wi = 1 wi = 0
Ii = 1 p11 p10
Ii = 0 p01 p00
where prs = Pr(wi = sjIi = r), with r;s = 0;1, is the probability that a household belonging to group r
records wi = s, Assumpt. 3 implies that the misclassi￿cation rates are characterized completely by the
two constants p01 the "false positive" rate and p10 the "false negative" rate. Moreover, under Assumpt.
2 the condition
p01 + p10 < 1
is satis￿ed.
In such a way, misclassi￿cation probability is treated as additional unknown parameters to be esti-
mated in the model. The identi￿cation of the parameters of interest together with p01 and p10 is proved
by contradiction in Mahajan (2006) and hence is not constructive in the sense that it leads directly to
an estimator. In this paper I construct an estimator by following a Bayesian approach.
I assume that the probability that a household has a high aversion to risk is constant and equal to
Pr(Ii = 1) = ￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1). Then, the conditional probability function for y and w, Pr(y;wjxi),
can be easily developed by integrating out the latent variable I:
Pr(y;wjxi)
= Pr(yjI = 1;xi) ￿ Pr(wjI = 1) ￿ P (I = 1) +
+Pr(yjI = 0;xi) ￿ Pr(wjI = 0) ￿ P (I = 0)
that can be expressed as:
Pr(y;wjxi) (4)
= [yF1i + (1 ￿ y)(1 ￿ F1i)][wp11 + (1 ￿ w)(1 ￿ p11)]￿ +
+[yF0i + (1 ￿ y)(1 ￿ F0i)][wp01 + (1 ￿ w)(1 ￿ p01)](1 ￿ ￿)
where F0i and F1i are, respectively, the probabilities for a low risk aversion investor and a high risk
aversion investor to hold risky assets.
The observed values of yi are just realizations of a binomial process with probabilities given by (3).




fF1i￿Ii [wip11 + (1 ￿ wi)(1 ￿ p11)]
+F0i (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Ii)[wip01 + (1 ￿ wi)(1 ￿ p01)]g
yi
￿f(1 ￿ F1i)￿Ii [wip11 + (1 ￿ wi)(1 ￿ p11)]+
+(1 ￿ F0i)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Ii)[wip01 + (1 ￿ wi)(1 ￿ p01)]g
(1￿yi) (5)
Conditional on wi = 1, the probability of realization yi = 1 is






while, conditional on wi = 0, the probability of realization yi = 1 is




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p01)
(1 ￿ p)
where p = Pr(wi = 1) = ￿p11 + (1 ￿ ￿)p01.
Finally I can de￿ne the conditional probability that the latent variable indicator is equal to 1 con-
ditional on (yi;wi;xi). Given that Pr(Ii = 1jyi;wi;xi) = Pr(Ii = 1;yi;wijxi)=Pr(yi;wijxi), from the
joint probability in (4), the conditional probability that Ii = 1 conditional on (yi;wi;xi) is
Pr(Ii = 1jyi;wi;xi) =
￿
￿p11F1i









￿p11 (1 ￿ F1i)




￿(1 ￿ p11)(1 ￿ F1i)
￿(1 ￿ p11)(1 ￿ F1i) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p01)(1 ￿ F0i)
￿(1￿yi)￿(1￿wi)
(6)
2.3 The assumption of misclassi￿cation dependence on explanatory vari-
ables
Results achieved in the previous section are obtained by imposing three assumptions. In particular the
latest one implies that the probability of misclassi￿cation does not depend upon the other explanatory
variables in the model (see Assumpt. 3). However, there is a strong feeling that misclassi￿cation error of
risk attitude is correlated with individual characteristics of investors, but, as underlined in the previous
section, once we allow for such dependence the model is no longer identi￿ed without further assumptions.
In order to relax the assumption of misclassi￿cation independence I need to use at least one more
surrogate for the latent risk attitude. Let fw1;w2g denote a couple of replicated measurements for
the latent variable I. I require that, conditional on the truth and the other explanatory variables,
the surrogates provide no further information about the response variable. Speci￿cally, Assumpt. 1 is
modi￿ed to
Pr(yi = 1jIi;w1i;w2i;xi) = Pr(yi = 1jIi;xi) (Assumpt. 4)
8I also limit the probability of misclassi￿cation, now conditional on the other regressors, by requiring
that for each replication
Pr(wji = 1jIi = 1;xi) > Pr(wji = 1jIi = 0;xi) j = 1;2 (Assumpt. 5)
Finally, I require that the two surrogates are independent conditional on the truth and the other
explanatory variables:
Pr(w1jw2;I;x) = Pr(w1jI;x) (Assumpt. 6)
I do not assume that the surrogates are identically distributed conditional on (I;x). While As-
sumpt. 6 restricts the nature of the conditional dependence between the surrogates, it allows them to
be unconditionally dependent one on the other. Under the above weaker assumptions, Mahajan (2006)
shows that the model is point identi￿ed, and hence a Bayesian estimator can be constructed in the same
fashion as in section 4.
We indicate the probability of misclassi￿cation conditional on the other regressors as pj11 (x) =




fF1i￿Ii [w1ip111 (x) + (1 ￿ w1i)(1 ￿ p111 (x))][w2ip211 (x) + (1 ￿ w2i)(1 ￿ p211 (x))]
+F0i (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Ii)[w1ip101 (x) + (1 ￿ w1i)(1 ￿ p101 (x))][w2ip201 + (1 ￿ w2i)(1 ￿ p201 (x))]g
yi
￿f(1 ￿ F1i)￿Ii [w1ip111 (x) + (1 ￿ w1i)(1 ￿ p111 (x))][w2ip211 + (1 ￿ w2i)(1 ￿ p211 (x))]+
+(1 ￿ F0i)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Ii)[w1ip101 (x) + (1 ￿ w1i)(1 ￿ p101 (x))]
[w2ip201 (x) + (1 ￿ w2i)(1 ￿ p201 (x))]g
(1￿yi)
The misclassi￿cation models for the two surrogates can be expressed as:









where G is a link function. Note that under Assumpt. 5 the condition ￿j > 0 (j = 1;2) is satis￿ed. In




j = 1;2, to
be estimated in the model.
3 A Bayesian approach to model estimation
The most common approach to the estimation of models with latent class variables is the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977). The EM algorithm does not routinely produce
standard errors. Standard errors can be obtained on the basis of the likelihood function, but they are
accurate only when the likelihood has a smooth, quadratic shape. For complex latent class models, this
is rarely the case. In addition, when parameters are estimated at or near a boundary the associated
standard errors may be a poor re￿ ection of inferential uncertainty or may be unavailable (Chung, 2003).
9The Data Augmentation (DA) approach (Schafer, 1997), a Bayesian procedure for incomplete data
problems, avoids three of the most prominent di¢ culties associated with the EM approach. First, the
Bayesian procedure does not require maximization of any function that can be numerically very di¢ cult
in this case. Second, DA provides a highly ￿ exible way of obtaining estimates and standard errors of
any desired combination of parameters. Finally, desirable estimation properties, such as consistency
and e¢ ciency, can be obtained at the cost of weak conditions on prior distributions of parameters.
Here, however, only vague prior information is assumed and the method is used mainly to summarize
the likelihood function and to obtain maximum likelihood estimates and their standard errors from it.
Estimate results, in fact, are interpreted in a purely classical way (Gelman et al. 2004).
3.1 The DA algorithm
Data Augmentation can be thought of as a Bayesian analog of the EM algorithm. Both EM and
DA treat latent variables as missing data. Whereas EM computes maximum-likelihood estimates of
model parameters, DA simulates random draws of parameters from their posterior distribution given
the observed data. In DA the user speci￿es starting values for the parameters. The algorithm alternates
between the following steps:
a) Simulate the missing data, i.e. the latent variables, given the current parameter estimates and the
observed data. This produces a complete data set, identical to the observed data with the addition of
the imputed latent variables.
b) Using the complete data set from the previous step, the prior distributions and the model, draw a
new set of parameters.
Alternating between these two steps creates a Markov chain, a sequence of random variables in which
the distribution of each element depends on that of the previous one. As iterations continue, however,
the dependence on the starting values eventually burns o⁄ and becomes negligible, at which point the
process is said to have achieved stationarity. For this reason, DA can be regarded as a special case of
Gibbs sampling (Casella and George, 1992) for incomplete-data problems.
The number of DA iterations required to achieve stationarity must be large enough for the lag-k
autocorrelation in every parameter to die down to zero. Thus, examining time-series and autocorrelation
plots that are based on the series of random parameters resulting from the DA run is a good way to
get a feel for the size of parameter k. Once we have identi￿ed a value for k we can base our inference
on simulated data at lag k only. In fact, the simulated data from successive iterations are correlated
but parameters￿draws spaced k or more cycles apart are not. Therefore, we retain the output of DA at
iterations k;2k;:::;Mk and use these data as M independent simulations.
3.2 Posterior analysis
As with all Bayesian models, one begins by postulating suitable prior distributions for all parame-
ters (￿;￿;￿;p11;p01), and then deriving the corresponding conditional posterior distributions given the
observed data.
The distribution function for the error term in (1) is assumed to be a logistic function. The most
10widely used Bayesian approach to the logistic regression model is to impose a normal prior with mean
c and covariance matrix ￿ on parameters ￿ and ￿, which can be made ￿almost di⁄use￿by centering at
c = 0 and setting ￿ = ￿I for some su¢ ciently large variance ￿. The e⁄ect of using normal priors with
means of 0 is that parameter estimates are smoothed toward zero. However, since this smoothing toward
zero e⁄ect is determined by the variance, it can be decreased by increasing the variances (Congdon, 2001).
In the case of independent misclassi￿cation, because Ii, wijIi = 1 and wijIi = 0 follow a multinomial
distribution, it is convenient to apply three prior distributions from the Dirichlet family (Schafer, 1997)
to their parameters, ￿;p11;p01.
In order to implement the DA sampling approach I need to derive the complete conditional distrib-
utions for all parameters in the model.
From (5) it is straightforward to identify the conditional posterior distributions of parameters. For
￿;p11;p01 the prior distributions are assumed to come from the Dirichlet family, respectively, with
parameters (￿1;￿0), (￿11;￿10), and (￿01;￿00) conventionally chosen. It follows that
p(￿j￿;￿;p11;p01;y;x;w;I) _ A￿








01 (1 ￿ p01)
n00+￿00￿1 (10)
where n1 and n0 are, respectively, the number of observations with Ii = 1 and Ii = 0, n11 and n10
are, respectively, the number of observations with (wi = 1jIi = 1) and (wi = 1jIi = 0), and n01 and n00
are, respectively, the number of observations with (wi = 0jIi = 1) and (wi = 0jIi = 0). Moreover, A, B
and C include all quantities not depending, respectively, on ￿, p11 and p01. Therefore, the conditional
posterior densities of ￿, p11 and p01 are proportional to Beta probability functions, respectively, with
parameters (n1 + ￿1;n0 + ￿0), (n11 + ￿11;n10 + ￿10) and (n01 + ￿01;n00 + ￿00).
The likelihood functions of ￿;p11;p01 are invariant under permutations of the latent risk aversion
groups. Thus, if there are no prior restrictions on the parameter space, the model cannot be identi￿ed
when the sample separation is imperfect (Lee and Porter, 1984). This occurs because the names of
two values assumed by the latent classes can be mutually exchangeable, then equations cannot be
distinguished. From an empirical point of view, this may result in switching labels of risk aversion classes
during the simulation. The non-identi￿cation problem (label switching) can be avoided in di⁄erent ways.
One approach is suggested by Celeux et. al. (1999) and consists in reallocating the labels of the latent
classes at each iteration of the Gibbs sampler. The approach followed here is to impose Assumpt. 2
that acts like a restriction on the parameter space.
In the case of misclassi￿cation dependent on explanatory variables the probability function Pr(wj = 1jI = 1;x)






Regarding parameters (￿;￿) = ￿, since ￿ are assumed to be independent from each other, their





_ L￿ (￿k) (11)
where ￿ (￿k) is a Guassian density with mean 0 and variance ￿. Since L is a product of logits and ￿ (￿k)
is the normal density, the conditional posterior distribution is not reducible to a standard distribution,
so I can adopt the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm (Metropolis et al., 1953; Hastings, 1970)2.
Now I know how to draw from the posterior of each parameter conditional on the other parameters.
I combine the procedures into a Gibbs sampler for the entire set of parameters. The Markov chain
estimation scheme operates as follows:
a) Start with arbitrary initial values for the parameters.
b) Simulate the missing variable Ii from the conditional distribution speci￿ed in (6), given the current
parameter values and the observed data.
c) Using the complete data set from the previous step, draw a new set of parameters from the conditional
posterior distributions speci￿ed in (8)-(10) for parameters ￿;p11;p01.
d) Using a Metropolis-Hastings step, draw a value for parameters (￿;￿) = ￿ from (11).
e) Return to step (b) employing the updated parameters in place of the initial values.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 The Data
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), conducted by the Bank of Italy every two years,
is the main source of information on the ￿nancial behavior of Italian households at the micro level.
The SHIW is a sample survey conducted by means of an interviewer-administered questionnaire which
contains questions on the social and demographic characteristics of household members, their incomes
and consumption expenditure. Since 1987 ￿nancial assets have been recorded on a regular basis.
The survey has a two-stage design (municipalities and households), with a strati￿cation of the pri-
mary sampling units (municipalities) by region and demographic size. Within each stratum, the munic-
ipalities in which interviews would be conducted were selected to include all those with a population of
more than 40,000 inhabitants (self-representing municipalities), while the smaller towns were selected on
the basis of probability proportional to size. The individual households to be interviewed were selected
randomly. In the 2006 survey 7,768 households were selected in this way. Further methodological details
on the SHIW are given in Banca d￿ Italia (2008).
In this paper I use a subjective question on ￿nancial risk preferences from the 2006 Survey of Italian
Households￿Income and Wealth. The answers to this question allow me to rank individuals with respect
to their risk aversion without having to assume a particular functional form for the utility function.
Respondents were asked the following question3:
2An alternative way to produce posterior inference for logistic models is to approximate the likelihood by a normal
distribution in ￿ and then apply the general computational methods for normal linear models (Gelman et al. 2004).
3The question about risk attitude is put only to the head of a household, i.e., the person who is primarily responsible
for the household budget.
12When managing your ￿nancial investments, would you describe yourself as someone who looks for:
(1) VERY HIGH returns, regardless of a HIGH risk of losing part of your capital;
(2) a GOOD return, with REASONABLE security for your invested capital;
(3) a REASONABLE return, with a GOOD degree of security for your invested capital;
(4) LOW returns, WITHOUT any RISK of losing your capital.
The answer to the question allows us to identify four groups of investors ranked from most willing
to least willing to take ￿nancial risk.
A great advantage of this survey question is that it o⁄ers a direct measure of individual attitudes,
avoiding the need to recover behavioral parameters by making restrictive identifying assumptions. How-
ever, this measure has some theoretical and empirical problems. One of the most serious limitations
concerns the fact that the measure comes from an absolutely subjective question and there is no way
to reliably assess whether their actual behavior would mimic their answers. Many economists are scep-
tical about the use of information based on subjective survey questions in general. In recent studies,
however, subjective information on various topics has been increasingly used (Dominitz and Manski,
1997). Another unfortunate aspect of the question is that people with no assets are expected to provide
strongly unreliable answers on their propensity to risk.
The large number of zero holdings for di⁄erent types of risky assets made it advisable to work with
just one highly aggregated category of risky ￿nancial assets, including stocks, private bonds, mutual
funds, foreign public bonds and foreign equities. The share of households owning at least one of these
￿nancial assets is about 15 per cent.
Table 1 shows the proportions of households owning risky ￿nancial assets according to di⁄erent risk
attitudes, as measured by the subjective question in the survey. As is clear, the number of owners
of risky assets increases as risk aversion decreases, with the exception of the middle groups where the
percentage of households with risky assets does not decrease with risk aversion. This pattern might
change signi￿cantly when controlling for other household characteristics in a complete choice model of
risky assets, but, as we will see later, it is mostly due to misclassi￿cation of investors.
4.2 The model estimate
As explanatory variables for the choice model of risky assets I include household income (euro value scaled
by 10,000), net wealth (expressed in quartiles in order to attenuate the measurement error and to model
nonlinearity), some household characteristics, such as household size, number of earners (dummy that
equals 1 when there are two labour income earners or more), area of residence, ownership of mortgage
debt, and variables related to the household head, such as age, gender, education (college education or
high-school diploma) and occupation (two dummy variables for self-employed and employee).4
I choose a normal prior N (0;￿) for the covariate parameters. To investigate the impact of the
choice of prior variance, I carried out sensitivity analysis by running the chains with di⁄erent values
4Occupation is de￿ned in relation to the entire household instead of the head of the household. A household is de￿ned
as self-employed when there is at least one self-employed member and the number of self-employed members is higher than
the number of employees. A household is de￿ned as employee in a similar way.
13for ￿ ranging between 103 to 106. The results do not change signi￿cantly, hence I report the summary
statistics based on the runs with ￿ = 103.
For the Bayesian procedure, 20,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampling were performed. The ￿rst 5,000
iterations were considered burn-in and the last 15,000 draws after convergence were retained from the
posterior. Since our inference of the posterior distribution of parameters is based on the simulation of
the posterior distribution by combining di⁄erent procedures into a Gibbs sampler, I need to monitor
the convergence of the chain before results across simulations have been combined. Autocorrelation
plots, not reported here for brevity, show that simulations have reached stationarity and I can retain
parameters￿simulations spaced 50 after convergence, for a total of 300 draws for each parameter.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 The case of perfect measurement
Tables 2 and 3 display the parameter estimates and their corresponding marginal e⁄ects for the choice
model described in sections 2.1 and 2.2. In particular in column [1] the choice model of risky assets
(Assumpt. 1) is estimated under the hypothesis that the risk aversion variable is perfectly measured,
i.e. it is not a⁄ected by misclassi￿cation.
Estimates show that parameters have the expected sign in most cases and are signi￿cantly almost
everywhere. Among others, the coe¢ cients of age, net wealth, area of residence and education are
economically the most important.
In particular, the age pattern is hump shaped, with a maximum probability of holding risky assets
between the ages of 45 and 65. This result should, however, be interpreted with caution since age e⁄ect
cannot be separated from cohort e⁄ects in a single cross-section.
Net wealth has a positive sign, with richer investors being more likely to hold risky assets: when net
wealth increases from the second to the third quartile the probability of holding risky assets increases
by only 1 percentage point, but when passing from the third to the fourth quartile it increases by 14
percentage points, thus indicating that minimum investment requirements and monetary transaction
costs are important sources of costs that limit participation in the stock market (Carroll, 2000; Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002).
The education dummies imply that the likelihood of investing in risky assets is correlated with
education levels, thus supporting the idea that managing risky assets is information intensive and requires
a degree of intellectual ability (King and Leape, 1987; Sims, 2001). A signi￿cant di⁄erence between
college education and high school is discernible.
Residents in the North of Italy are much more likely to hold risky assets than residents in the Centre,
with the latter being more likely to invest in risky assets than residents in the South. The importance of
the area of residence might indicate strong di⁄erences in ￿nancial development between di⁄erent areas
of the country.
Self-employed people are less likely to hold risky assets than employees, in line with the view that
self-employed people face undiversi￿able income risks. No di⁄erence between employees and people who
are not employed is detectable.
14Male heads of households have a much higher probability of holding risky assets with respect to
female investors. Also labour income has a positive but feeble impact on the ownership of risky assets.
Family size, number of income earners and the presence of mortgage debt do not seem to impact on
the ownership of risky assets.
With regard to the risk preference model [1] identi￿es a strong e⁄ect of risk aversion on the ownership
of risky assets, but, as anticipated in the previous descriptive analysis (section 4.1), the probability of
holding risky assets increases when risk aversion decreases with the exception of the middle groups.
4.3.2 The case of independent misclassi￿cation
In column [2] of Tables 2 and 3 estimate results are shown for when the subjective question in the survey
is considered imperfect and the framework outlined in section 2.2 is estimated under the assumptions
(Assumpt. 1), (Assumpt. 2) and (Assumpt. 3). When information drawn from the subjective question
in the survey is considered imperfect, the sign, signi￿cance and the marginal e⁄ects of the parameters
remain almost the same, thus underlining the good performance of the subjective question when used
as a control in a portfolio choice model.
Nevertheless a strong di⁄erence emerges concerning the risk aversion parameters. The coe¢ cients
of the latent risk attitude have the expected sign, indicating that the probability of holding risky assets
increases when risk aversion decreases. Moreover, risk attitude now represents the most important
element for explaining di⁄erences in risky ￿nancial behavior. In particular, when investors￿risk aversion
is "very low", the probability of holding risky assets increases by 31 percentage points with respect to
investors with a "very high" aversion to risk; when the risk aversion is "low", the probability increases
by 14 percentage points, and when the risk aversion is "high" the probability increases by about 8
percentage points.
Model [2] also allows me to analyze the misclassi￿cation of investors in terms of risk attitude. Table
4 reports the estimate of the transition probability matrix and clearly shows that the probability of
misclassi￿cation decreases as latent risk aversion increases, that means that more risk tolerant investors
tend to be classi￿ed erroneously more often than less risk tolerant investors. In other words, according
to the model over-reporting of risk aversion is more penetrative than under-reporting of risk aversion. In
particular, the probability of misclassifying a "very low" risk aversion investor (over-reporting) is about
8 times that of misclassifying a "very high" risk aversion investor (under-reporting).
One possible explanation for this result is that the subjective question on risk attitude is basically
factual, so it seems to naturally lead respondents to over-report their risk aversion. For instance, a
risk tolerant individual, who does not hold risky assets (because his/her level of education is low, for
instance), may be led to say he/she is risk averse. In this way, individuals who are more risk tolerant
and do not hold risky assets may be induced to declare they are more risk averse, while individuals who
are less risk tolerant would provide more reliable answers on average.
Another reason for the di⁄erential misclassi￿cation may be that more risk tolerant investors might
be a⁄ected by a kind of illusion of control (Langer, 1982) that leads them to underestimate the risk
taken and thus to declare themselves as more risk averse than they e⁄ectively are.
15When correcting for misclassi￿cation, the average level of willingness to take ￿nancial risk does not
increase since misclassi￿cation of risk tolerant investors is compensated for by misclassi￿cation of risk
averse investors who represent a large part of the population (see Table 5).
4.3.3 The case of misclassi￿cation dependent on explanatory variables
Results achieved in the previous sections are obtained by imposing three assumptions. In particular one
of those implies that the probability of misclassi￿cation does not depend upon the other explanatory
variables in the model (see Assumpt. 3). However, there is a strong feeling that misclassi￿cation error
of risk attitude is correlated with the individual characteristics of investors. As outlined in section 2.3,
in order to control for such dependence I need to use at least one more surrogate for the latent risk
aversion and to impose the assumptions (Assumpt. 4), (Assumpt. 5) and (Assumpt. 6).
The second available surrogate for the true risk attitude comes from the 2004 Survey on Household
Income and Wealth (Banca d￿ Italia, 2006). As part of the 2004 sample comprised households interviewed
in the 2006 survey (panel households), it is possible to use the answers to the subjective question on risk
preference for a subsample of households. Unfortunately not all panel households can be used since in
the 2004 survey wave, the question on risk preference was put only to households with ￿nancial assets
other than bank or post o¢ ce current accounts. The ￿nal subsample comprises 1,253 households.5 In
order to control for selection bias, the subsample of analysis is post-strati￿ed on the basis of certain
individual characteristics of the respondents in order to re-weight the various segments of the population
within the sample (Kalton and Flores Cervantes, 2003). This is done by aligning the characteristics of
the ￿nal sample to those of the entire 2006 sample in terms of gender, age group, geographical area,
occupation and ownership of risky assets. However, after poststrati￿cation, the subsample is still a
little di⁄erent to the entire sample, thus the estimate results must be interpreted and compared to the
previous ones with caution.
Table 6 is the 4 ￿ 4 contingency table of investors according to the risk aversion variables observed
in the 2004 and 2006 waves. The two categorical variables do not appear to be strongly associated: the
Gamma index equals 0.3614, and only around 50 per cent of households declare exactly the same degree
of risk aversion at the two dates. This result seems to con￿rm the presence of signi￿cant measurement
errors in the two variables.
Since the number of observations in the subsample is very limited, the two variables of the observed
risk attitude are recoded into two dummy variables that value 1 when the investor reports a low or very
low risk aversion, and 0 when the investor reports a high or very high risk aversion. Thus, the latent
risk attitude is now considered dichotomous. For the same reasons also the dummy variables for age are
reduced to just two: one for investors aged between 45 and 65 and the other for those aged over 65.
Table 7 displays the parameter estimates: the ￿rst two columns report estimate results for the part
concerning the misclassi￿cation model (7); the third column shows the marginal e⁄ects￿estimate for the
part concerning the demand model.
5The subsample size can even be smaller as some households are discarded when the household member who answered
the risk aversion question in 2004 is di⁄erent to the member who answered in 2006.
16Estimates for the misclassi￿cation model show that age, net wealth, gender, education and area of
residence represent the most important variables for explaining misclassi￿cation of risk attitude. From
misclassi￿cation models it is possible to estimate the probability of over-reporting and under-reporting
the degree of risk aversion as, respectively, Pr(wi = 2jIi = 1) and Pr(wi = 1jIi = 2). Results shown in
Table 8 indicate that, as also outlined in the previous analysis, over-reporting of risk aversion is much
more penetrative than under-reporting: 30 per cent of households who declare they are high risk averse
are low risk averse, while 15 per cent of those who declare they are low risk averse are high risk averse.
Over-reporting has di⁄erentiated patterns according to household characteristics: it is more prominent
for older, male, residents in the south or islands, less educated and not employed people. By contrast,
under-reporting of risk aversion does not vary much with household characteristics. Note also that
over-reporting of risk aversion is higher for households owning risky assets, thus indicating that the
hypothesis of investors￿illusion of control might be the main cause of misclassi￿cation.
Even though the hypothesis of non-di⁄erential misclassi￿cation behavior of investors cannot be
discarded, estimates for the demand model are fundamentally in line with those of the previous analysis.
Some important di⁄erences are, however, discernible. In particular, coe¢ cient of second quartile of
net wealth is not signi￿cant now and, in general, the e⁄ect of net wealth is strongly attenuated, thus
further strengthening the hypothesis of the presence of minimum investment requirements and monetary
transaction costs that limit participation in ￿nancial markets.
Also the e⁄ect of age is reduced, and family size is negatively correlated with the probability of holding
risky assets: this result might be explained by a reduction of savings coming from the increase of number
of dependent household members. Households with mortgage debt have a higher probability of holding
risky assets, supporting the idea that households consider mortgage debt a rather safe investment and
use risky assets to diversify their assets.
The parameter estimate of risk aversion con￿rms the results outlined in the main analysis: risk
attitude represents the most important element for explaining di⁄erences in risky ￿nancial behavior,
also when controlling for the di⁄erential misclassi￿cation behavior of investors.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the role of risk aversion in an empirical choice model of risky assets. The risk aversion
measure comes from a subjective question in a survey and it is supposed to be an imperfect information
about the true risk attitude of investors. Under a minimal set of distributional assumptions, the choice
model of risky assets with misclassi￿ed risk aversion is point identi￿ed and a Bayesian procedure for
incomplete-data problems can be developed in order to get robust estimates. The model is applied to
data from the 2006 Survey on Household Income and Wealth by the Bank of Italy.
The main results of the paper is that when the misclassi￿cation of investors is taken into account,
the economic content of the model remains the same in terms of household characteristics￿e⁄ect, thus
underlining the good performance of the subjective question when used as a control in portfolio choice
models. When correcting for misclassi￿cation the risk attitude represents the most important factor
for explaining di⁄erences in risky ￿nancial behavior. A clear misclassi￿cation pattern emerges from
17the data: probability of misclassi￿cation decreases as latent risk aversion increases, that means that
less risk averse investors tend to be classi￿ed erroneously more often than more risk averse investors.
The over-reporting of risk aversion might be mainly due to two factors: on the one hand risk tolerant
individuals may be led to say they are risk averse since they do not hold risky assets because of their
low level of wealth, education and so on; on the other hand more risk tolerant investors may be a⁄ected
by a kind of illusion of control that leads them to underestimate the risk taken and thus to declare
themselves as more risk averse than they e⁄ectively are. The analysis shows that the latter hypothesis
seems to prevail over the former.
18Table 1: Households owning risky ￿nancial assets(+) by observed risk aversion
Percentage of households Percentage owning risky
￿nancial assets
Risk aversion:
1. very low 0.90 30.55
2. low 14.89 21.89
3. high 35.26 22.89
4. very high 48.95 7.46
Total 100.00 15.26
Source: SHIW, 2006.
(+) : include stocks, private bonds, mutual funds, and foreign equities.
19Table 2: Bayesian estimates of cross-sectional model of household demand for risky assets(+)
[1] [2]
Variable:
Intercept -4.136* (0.1308) -4.141* (0.1249)
Age: between 25 and 45 0.592* (0.1026) 0.589* (0.1176)
between 45 and 65 0.763* (0.1026) 0.761* (0.1133)
more than 65 0.641* (0.1174) 0.644* (0.1207)
Labour Income (scaled by 10,000) 0.048* (0.0076) 0.047* (0.0077)
Net wealth: second quartile 0.525* (0.0498) 0.524* (0.0505)
third quartile 0.603* (0.0556) 0.611* (0.0495)
fourth quartile 1.289* (0.0505) 1.300* (0.0501)
Male 0.192* (0.0322) 0.194* (0.0362)
Family size 0.0064 (0.0162) 0.0054 (0.0157)
Two income earners or more -0.076 (0.0435) -0.073 (0.0425)
North 1.042* (0.0412) 1.045* (0.0379)
Centre 0.274* (0.0443) 0.268* (0.0496)
College education 0.617* (0.0613) 0.614* (0.0551)
High school diploma 0.523* (0.0396) 0.526* (0.0378)
Self-employed -0.349* (0.0688) -0.347* (0.0608)
Employee -0.061 (0.0523) -0.056 (0.0428)
Mortgage debt -0.009 (0.0654) -0.003 (0.0564)
Risk Aversion: Observed Latent
1. very low 0.905* (0.1453) 1.440* (0.7010)
2. low 0.506* (0.0478) 0.783* (0.1972)
3. high 0.579* (0.0327) 0.566* (0.0377)
4. very high (baseline)
No. of Obs.: 7768
Source: SHIW, 2006. 20,000 iterations; estimates on the last 5,000 iterations.
(+) : include stocks, private bonds, mutual funds, and foreign equities.
[1] The choice model of risky assets is estimated under the hypothesis that risk aversion is not a⁄ected by
misclassi￿cation.
[2] The choice model of risky assets is estimated under the hypothesis that risk aversion is a⁄ected by misclas-
si￿cation, and the misclassi￿cation is independent on other variables.
*: signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at 5 per cent. Standard error are reported in parentheses.




Age: between 25 and 45 0.0901* 0.0900*
between 45 and 65 0.1147* 0.1149*
more than 65 0.1001* 0.1007*
Labour Income (scaled by 10,000) 0.0064* 0.0063*
Net wealth: second quartile 0.0816* 0.0816*
third quartile 0.0911* 0.0926*
fourth quartile 0.2289* 0.2318*
Male 0.0257* 0.0261*
Family size 0.0009 0.0007
Two income earners or more -0.0104 -0.0101
North 0.1421* 0.1433*
Centre 0.0406* 0.0398*
College education 0.1039* 0.1036*
High school diploma 0.0793* 0.0802*
Self-employed -0.0427* -0.0428*
Employee -0.0084 -0.0078
Ownership of mortgage debt -0.0012 -0.0004
Risk Aversion: Observed Latent
1. very low 0.1727* 0.3136*
2. low 0.0802* 0.1435*
3. high 0.0848* 0.0781*
4. very high (baseline)
No. of Obs.: 7768
Source: SHIW, 2006. 20,000 iterations; estimates on the last 5,000 iterations.
(+) : include stocks, private bonds, mutual funds, and foreign equities.
[1] The choice model of risky assets is estimated under the hypothesis that risk aversion is not a⁄ected by
misclassi￿cation.
[2] The choice model of risky assets is estimated under the hypothesis that risk aversion is a⁄ected by misclas-
si￿cation, and the misclassi￿cation is independent on other variables.
*: signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at 5 per cent. Standard error are reported in parentheses.
21Table 4: Bayesian estimates of transition probabilities, prs = Pr(wi = sjIi = r)
Observed risk aversion
wi = 1 wi = 2 wi = 3 wi = 4
Latent risk aversion
Ii = 1 0.6383 0.1305 0.1431 0.0882
Ii = 2 0.1061 0.6812 0.1218 0.0909
Ii = 3 0.0070 0.2575 0.7250 0.0105
Ii = 4 0.0025 0.0289 0.0125 0.9560
Source: SHIW, 2006.
Table 5: Fraction of households owning risky ￿nancial assets(+) by latent risk aversion
Percentage of households Percentage owning risky
Latent risk aversion: ￿nancial assets
1. very low 0.59 52.55
2. low 2.01 25.51
3. high 47.08 22.76
4. very high 50.32 7.44
Total 100.00 15.26
Source: SHIW, 2006.
(+) : include stocks, private bonds, mutual funds, and foreign equities.
Table 6: Contingency table of risk aversion surrogates (percentage values)
Risk aversion 2006
Risk aversion 2004 1. very low 2. low 3. high 4. very high Total
1. very low 0.08 0.80 0.15 0.03 1.06
2. low 0.17 2.89 4.92 2.42 10.40
3. high 0.54 4.69 16.81 14.11 36.15
4. very high 0.23 7.12 14.39 30.66 52.39
Total 1.01 15.51 36.27 47.21 100.00
Gamma association index: 0.3614
Source: SHIW, 2004 and 2006
22Table 7: Bayesian estimates of cross-sectional model of household demand for risky assets(+) with
misclassi￿cation model
Misclassi￿cation model Behavioral model
Low risk aversion Low risk aversion Ownership of
observed for 2004 observed for 2006 risky assets
Variable: (marginal e⁄ects)
Intercept -1.429* -1.075*
Age: between 45 and 65 -0.650* -0.571* -0.0116
more than 65 -1.020* -0.888* -0.0710*
Labour Income (scaled by 10,000) 0.197* 0.077* 0.0076*
Net wealth: second quartile 0.419* 0.089* 0.0003
third quartile 0.656* -0.215* 0.0570*
fourth quartile 0.989* -0.073 0.2076*
Male 0.337* 0.460* 0.0359*
Family size -0.164* -0.223* -0.0234*
Two income earners or more -0.707* 0.235* -0.0150
North -0.655* -0.046 0.1288*
Centre -0.743* 0.191* 0.0089
College education 0.520* 0.496* 0.1169*
High school diploma 0.149* 0.560* 0.0560*
Self-employed -0.146 -0.228* -0.0460*
Employee -0.055 -0.197* -0.0175*
Ownership of mortgage debt -0.331* -0.487* 0.0363*
Latent Risk Aversion:
low 3.765* 2.287* 0.7370*
high (baseline)
No. of Obs.: 1485
Source: SHIW, 2004 and 2006. 20,000 iterations; estimates on the last 5,000 iterations.
(+) : include stocks, private bonds, mutual funds, and foreign equities.
*: signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at 5 per cent.
23Table 8: Probability of misclassi￿cation by household characteristic (percentage values)
Risk aversion Risk aversion
Variable: over-reporting under-reporting
Ownership of risky assets No 9.39 14.71
Yes 37.44 16.10
Age: less than 45 1.43 22.44
between 45 and 65 29.65 12.28
more than 65 53.79 7.74
Net wealth: ￿rst quartile 18.06 14.86
second quartile 50.34 16.20
third quartile 40.52 13.22
fourth quartile 18.23 15.32
Gender: female 28.07 9.67
male 32.73 17.17
Area of residence: north 17.80 13.55
centre 51.76 18.79
south or islands 56.44 14.41
Education: college education 3.48 20.71
high school diploma 14.69 22.89
middle school or less 42.46 8.97
Occupation: self-employed 31.35 17.29
employee 20.53 16.42
not employed 44.08 12.53
Total 30.61 14.89
Source: SHIW, 2004 and 2006.
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